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The	tragicomedy	of	Brexit	needs	resolution	by
another	referendum
In	recent	weeks,	there	has	been	widespread	discussion	of	the	possibility	of	a	new	referendum	later	in
the	year	to	endorse	or	reject	the	terms	negotiated	by	Theresa	May	and	her	government	for	British
withdrawal	from	the	European	Union.	Brendan	Donnelly	(Federal	Trust)	asks	whether	this	time
around	an	EU	referendum	would	reflect	reality.
A	surprising	potential	supporter	of	a	new	referendum	has	been	Nigel	Farage.	His	intervention	in	the
debate,	together	with	the	earnest	assurances	of	the	Prime	Minister	that	no	further	European
consultation	will	take	place,	have	convinced	many	observers	of	the	likelihood,	perhaps	even
inevitability,	of	a	further	referendum	in	the	autumn	of	this	year.	The	case	for	such	a	referendum	will	be	strong	if	May
succeeds	in	reaching	an	accord	with	her	EU	partners	on	Brexit.	It	will	be	even	stronger	if	she	fails	to	reach	any
agreement	at	all.
It	is	an	often-repeated	argument	of	May	and	her	supporters	that	if,	as	is	entirely	possible,	Parliament	votes	to	reject
the	outcome	of	her	Brexit	negotiations,	then	that	will	simply	lead	to	the	UK’s	leaving	the	EU	in	March	2019,	without
an	agreement	of	any	kind	(‘No	Deal	Brexit’).	Any	such	rejection	by	Parliament	would,	therefore,	have	the	paradoxical
consequence	of	merely	worsening	what	Parliament	would	have	already	deemed	unsatisfactory	terms	for	Brexit.	This
argument	has	a	certain	superficial	plausibility,	given	the	automaticity	of	Article	50	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	But	its
plausibility	can	only	become	reality	if	Parliament,	having	rejected	the	terms	for	Brexit	negotiated	(or	not	negotiated)
by	the	Conservative	government,	were	content	to	do	nothing	between	the	date	of	this	rejection	(perhaps	in
September	or	October	of	this	year)	and	March	2019.
For	the	majority	of	MPs	opposed	to	Brexit,	an	effective	and	politically	astute	way	to	fill	that	intervening	period	would
precisely	be	the	holding	of	a	referendum	on	the	negotiated	and	rejected	terms,	with	a	real	chance	of	these	terms
being	rejected	by	the	electorate	as	well.		No	government	would	dare	to	proceed	to	leave	the	Union	on	these	terms	in
face	of	rejection	by	both	Parliament	and	the	electorate.	Having	received	contradictory	signals	on	Brexit	in	successive
referendums,	it	would	then	be	open	to	Parliament	to	take	back	control	of	the	Brexit	process	either	by	seeking	to
prolong	the	negotiating	period	foreseen	under	Article	50	or	withdraw	the	Article	50	notification	altogether.
The	holding	of	a	referendum	on	the	Brexit	terms	would	be	particularly	attractive	to	two	important	audiences	within	the
House	of	Commons,	namely	the	great	majority	of	Labour	MPs	who	oppose	Brexit	and	the	small	minority	of
Conservative	MPs	who	share	that	opposition.	It	is	difficult	to	see	how	the	negotiated	Brexit	terms	can	ever	meet	the
criteria	laid	down	by	Sir	Keir	Starmer	for	Labour	to	support	them.	Labour	will	almost	certainly	have	good	grounds	for
rejecting	the	proposed	Conservative	terms	for	Brexit.	A	further	referendum	would	enable	them	to	voice	this
opposition	unambiguously,	while	entrusting	a	final	decision	on	the	matter	to	the	electorate	as	a	whole.		Equally,	the
twenty	or	thirty	Conservative	MPs	who	continue	to	have	fundamental	reservations	about	Brexit	might	well	be
attracted	by	the	possibility	of	a	new	referendum.	Without	such	a	referendum,	the	only	way	Brexit	can	conceivably	be
prevented	is	the	overthrow	of	the	present	Conservative	government.	This	a	great	deal	to	ask	of	life-long	members	of
the	Conservative	Party.	Kenneth	Clarke	and	those	around	him	will	not	wish	to	be	seen	as	those	who	facilitated
Corbyn’s	path	to	10	Downing	Street.
No	Brexit	on	the	rejected	terms
If	a	majority	can	be	constructed	in	the	House	of	Commons	for	a	further	referendum	it	would	be	surprising	if	the
necessary	legislation	and	administrative	arrangements	could	not	be	put	in	place	for	a	popular	vote	at	the	end	of	2018
or	early	in	2019.	The	question	asked	would	be	whether	the	electorate	accepted	or	rejected	the	Brexit	terms
negotiated	(or	not	negotiated)	by	May’s	government.	If	they	were	accepted	by	the	electorate,	the	UK	would	leave	the
EU	in	March,	2019.	If	they	were	rejected,	the	Conservative	government	would	have	a	number	of	choices.		It	could
ask	for	an	extension	of	the	Article	50	negotiating	period;	it	could	withdraw	the	Article	50	notification;	it	could	bring
about	a	new	General	Election;	it	could	resign;	it	could	be	reconstituted	as	a	coalition	government.	The	only	option
that	would	no	longer	be	open	to	it	would	be	simply	to	leave	the	EU	on	29th	March	2019.
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Those	from	the	traditional	“Remain”	camp	who	are	hesitant	about	a	new	referendum	are	often	hesitant	for	one	of
three	reasons.	They	fear	that	the	result	of	this	new	plebiscite	will	be	identical	to	that	of	June	2016;	they	fear	that	any
revocation	of	Article	50	will	be	subject	to	unattractive	conditions	imposed	by	other	members	of	the	EU;	or	they	fear
that	the	nature	of	the	agreement	presented	to	the	Commons	later	this	year	will	be	so	vague	as	to	make	inappropriate
a	further	referendum	on	it.	In	regard	to	the	first	concern,	there	can	obviously	be	no	guarantee	as	to	the	outcome	of	a
new	referendum.		But	public	opinion	has	been	moving	consistently,	if	slowly	against	Brexit	in	recent	months.	There	is
good	reason	to	suppose	that	this	evolution	of	opinion	will	continue	as	negotiations	with	the	EU	make	ever	clearer	the
damaging	economic	consequences	of	Brexit.	Nor	is	it	obvious	that	our	partners	in	the	EU	would	have	any	desire	to
put	unnecessary	obstacles	in	the	way	of	any	British	decision	to	revoke	the	Article	50	notification.	It	is	not	even	legally
clear	that	they	would	be	entitled	to	do	so.
No	more	eating	eaten	cake
More	serious	on	the	other	hand	is	the	concern	that	if	an	agreement	is	concluded	in	the	autumn	of	this	year,	it	will	be
insufficiently	precise	to	form	the	basis	of	a	rational	further	plebiscite.	Michel	Barnier	has	spoken	of	this	agreement	as
containing	detailed	provisions	for	British	withdrawal	from	the	EU,	but	only	a	general	political	declaration	about	the
UK’s	future	trading	relationship	with	the	Union.		It	is	true	that	the	details	of	the	UK’s	future	trading	relationship	with
the	EU	will	need	to	be	worked	out	over	a	number	of	years,	probably	extending	beyond	the	proposed	ending	of	the
standstill	period	at	the	end	of	2020.	But	the	EU	will	insist	as	a	precondition	for	granting	the	UK	this	standstill	period
clarity	about	the	nature	of	the	future	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	that	is	eventually	in	prospect.	It	will	not
be	sufficient	for	the	British	government	to	speak	glibly	about	a	future	special	or	bespoke	relationship.	Any	document
agreed	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	will	make	much	clearer	than	has	ever	been	the	case	until	now	that	the	United
Kingdom	emphatically	cannot	have	its	cake	and	eat	it.		The	nature	of	the	trade-offs	in	which	the	UK	must	engage	will
be	clear	for	all	to	see.	It	was	only	possible	for	the	“Leave”	side	to	win	the	referendum	of	2016	by	the	most	brazen
denying	of	the	need	for	such	trade-offs.	A	referendum	fought	about	the	real	implications	of	Brexit	has	every	chance
of	generating	a	very	different	result	in	2018	from	that	obtained	by	wishful	thinking	and	deception	in	2016.
If	the	House	of	Commons	is	to	endorse	a	referendum	later	in	the	year,	it	is	clear	that	both	the	majority	of	Labour	MPs
and	the	minority	of	Conservative	MPs	will	need	to	move	beyond	their	present	political	positions.	Despite	his	well-
advertised	dislike	for	the	European	Union,	Jeremy	Corbyn	would	be	taking	a	considerable	and	avoidable	political	risk
if	he	simply	allowed	a	Conservative	Brexit	to	be	inflicted	on	the	country	with	only	rhetorical	opposition	to	it	from	the
Labour	Party.	There	are	the	beginnings	of	organisation	and	dissent	within	the	Conservative	Parliamentary	Party	that
could	well	find	increasingly	effective	expression	as	the	year	unfolds.	This	dissident	current	of	opinion	might	well	be
sufficient	to	ensure	a	narrow	Parliamentary	majority	against	whatever	terms	May	is	able	to	negotiate.
Public	Domain
A	new	Conservative	leader?
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If	there	is	a	further	referendum,	the	intriguing	question	poses	itself	of	who	will	be	the	leader	of	the	Conservative	Party
during	it.	It	seems	very	unlikely	that	the	Conservative	Party	would	continue	to	tolerate	May	as	its	leader	in	such
circumstances.	The	Party	would	naturally	wish	to	be	led	by	a	more	attractive	and	persuasive	figure,	above	all	by	a
political	leader	convinced	of	the	merits	of	Brexit.	There	are	many	respects	in	which	this	would	be	a	useful	and
cleansing	clarification	of	the	political	landscape.	May	has	on	a	number	of	occasions	recently	refused	to	specify	how
she	would	vote	in	a	new	referendum.	That	the	British	government	has	been	led	over	the	past	eighteen	months	in	the
perilous	adventure	of	Brexit	by	a	Prime	Minister	who	clearly	realizes	the	damage	this	reckless	venture	may	impose
on	her	country,	but	feels	powerless	to	prevent	it,	has	been	a	personal	humiliation	for	her	and	exposed	this	country	to
scorn	and	ridicule	abroad.	Michael	Heseltine	supposedly	advised	May	to	ensure	that	the	Brexit	negotiations	were
largely	carried	out	by	Conservative	ministers	supportive	of	Brexit.	In	that	the	public	prestige	of	ministers	such	as
Boris	Johnson,	Liam	Fox	and	David	Davis	has	been	reduced	by	their	clumsy	negotiating	efforts,	Lord	Heseltine’s
advice	may	well	have	been	prescient.	A	new	referendum	would	ensure	that	this	sound	advice	was	applied	to	the
Conservative	Premiership	as	well.
Not	the	least	of	the	ironies	of	Brexit	is	that	if	Boris	Johnson	had	been	in	charge	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	over	the	last
eighteen	months,	the	whole	implausible	project	might	well	have	collapsed	long	ago	under	the	weight	of	its	own
contradictions,	contradictions	he	would	have	exacerbated	by	his	self-absorbed	carelessness.	It	is	debatable	whether
May	has	served	her	party	well	since	she	became	Prime	Minister.	Her	relative	success	in	keeping	the	project	of	Brexit
just	about	alive	until	now	has	certainly	not	served	the	country	well.	Sir	Winston	Churchill	described	his	eventual
return	to	the	Conservative	Party	after	leaving	them	for	the	Liberals	before	the	First	World	War	as	“ratting	and	then
reratting.”		If	there	is	a	new	referendum	on	Brexit,	Theresa	May,	deposed	from	the	Conservative	leadership,	will	have
the	opportunity	of	following	this	Churchillian	example.	The	already	rich	tragi-comedy	of	Brexit	would	be	further
enhanced	by	the	spectacle	of	May	as	a	(no	doubt	tepid)	opponent	in	the	coming	referendum	of	the	Brexit	agreement
she	had	herself	signed.
An	earlier	version	of	this	post	appeared	on	The	Federal	Trust	and	it	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those
of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Brendan	Donnelly	has	been	Director	of	the	Federal	Trust	since	January	2003	and	is	a	Senior	Research	Fellow	at	the
Global	Policy	Institute.	He	is	a	former	Member	of	the	European	Parliament	(1994	to	1999).
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